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In Brief
Wittmann et al. find that we confuse own
performance with the performance of
others, depending on whether we
cooperate or compete with them. This
confusion is reflected in area 9, indicating
it interdependently processes
information about ourselves and others.
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To survive, humans must estimate their own ability
and the abilities of others. We found that, although
people estimated their abilities on the basis of their
ownperformance in a rationalmanner, their estimates
of themselves were partly merged with the perfor-
mance of others. Reciprocally, their ability estimates
for others also reflected their own, as well as the
others’, performance. Self-other mergence operated
in a context-dependent manner: interacting with
high or low performers, respectively, enhanced and
diminished own ability estimates in cooperative con-
texts, but the opposite occurred in competitive
contexts. Self-other mergence not only influenced
subjective evaluations, it also affected how people
subsequently objectively adjusted their performance.
Perigenual anterior cingulate cortex tracked one’s
own performance. Dorsomedial frontal area 9 tracked
others’ performances, but also integrated contextual
and self-related information. Self-other mergence
increasedwith thestrengthof self andother represen-
tations in area 9, suggesting it carries interdependent
representations of self and other.
INTRODUCTION
Social environments require humans and other primates to
monitor others (Chang et al., 2013a, 2013b; Ruff and Fehr,
2014) and to know not only their own abilities, but also the abil-
ities of others. This knowledge guides establishment of social
dominance hierarchies (Zink et al., 2008) and can be linked to
features of brain structure and function (Noonan et al., 2014;
Sallet et al., 2011). It guides animals’ choices in a powerful
way. For example, the decision to engage in fundamental modes
of social interaction such as cooperation or competition with a
conspecific is guided by knowledge about their abilities and so-
cial status relative to one’s own (Wang et al., 2011). Estimating
abilities of both self and others on the basis of past performance
may be particularly important for humans, as they are able to co-
ordinate and execute multi-step tasks such as building a shelter482 Neuron 91, 482–493, July 20, 2016 ª 2016 The Authors. Publishe
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or making complex decisions in groups (Kerr and Tindale, 2004).
Moreover, they have to use this knowledge flexibly because
social alliances can change very quickly: a competitor within
one’s own company might quickly become a cooperator when
competing with a different company.
It has been a long-standing idea in psychology that humans
derive expectations about whether they will succeed in a given
task from their past task performance (Bandura, 1977). At the
same time, people do not learn about themselves in isolation
but relative to their social environment. Comparisons with other
people can be used as an effective means for self-evaluation
(Festinger, 1954; Mussweiler, 2003), and, conversely, people
base judgments of other people on knowledge of their own traits
(Allport, 1924; Krueger, 2010). However, the social influence on
judgments of self and others can vary. We might be influenced
more strongly by others simply because we like them (Heider,
1958); we might, by default, evaluate members of our own group
more positively than members of a different group (Brewer,
1979), and we might perceive others as more similar to us
when we cooperate with them than when we compete with
them (Toma et al., 2010). In sum, learning about self and others
is often based on all three aspects: objective experience, self/
other comparisons, and the social context.
In the field of neuroscience, we are only beginning to explore
the computational and neural mechanisms that underlie how
people learn about the abilities of other people (Boorman et al.,
2013), but even less is known about how we learn about our
own abilities. Reward-related brain signals scale with the payoff
for oneself relative to the payoff of other people (Fliessbach et al.,
2007). Recently, it has been shown that one’s own choice pref-
erences can be biased toward the observed choice preferences
of other people (Garvert et al., 2015; Nicolle et al., 2012) and that
this depends on the identity of the other person consistent with
psychological theories (Izuma and Adolphs, 2013). However, un-
like choice preferences, where there is no clear right and wrong,
there is often objective information available about our own abil-
ities. For instance, the time one needs to run 100 m ought to be
well predicted by the previous occasions on which one ran 100
m. In this sense, ability judgments can be based on objective
performance feedback attributable unambiguously to ourselves.
Here, we test, first, whether we estimate our abilities from
monitoring our performance over time just as we estimate the
values of our actions from monitoring their outcomes (Dawd by Elsevier Inc.
commons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Figure 1. Task Design
(A) Schematic of trial events. On every trial, all players played a minigame, after which parametric performance feedback was provided (upper right; higher bars
indicate better performance) that enabled performance to be learned. Letters indicate subject initials for Self (S; middle position) and two other players. A relevant
(legend continued on next page)
Neuron 91, 482–493, July 20, 2016 483
et al., 2011). We show that the history of an individual’s perfor-
mance is indeed used to estimate their ability. Second, we test
whether ability estimated for oneself is also dependent on the
performance of other people. We find that, surprisingly, the per-
formances of other people also influence individuals’ assess-
ments of their own abilities. When we are cooperating with
someone who performs well, our estimates of our own ability
are inflated, and when we are cooperating with someone who
performs poorly our ability estimates are depressed. Recipro-
cally, the ability of another individual is estimated not only from
the other’s performance, but also from one’s own performance.
We demonstrate that such self-other mergence not only impacts
on people’s subjective evaluation of themselves and others, but
even affects how they subsequently adjust their performance.
We refer to ability estimation for self and others based on their
respective performance history as ‘‘appropriate,’’ while we refer
to the misattribution of past self-related performance when esti-
mating others’ abilities (or other-related performance to estimate
one’s own ability) as self-other mergence (SOM; see Figure 2A
for an illustration).
Human subjects performed an experiment in an MRI scanner.
Distinct regions in medial frontal cortex (Neubert et al., 2015)
tracked the estimated abilities of self (perigenual anterior cingu-
late cortex; pgACC) and other (area 9) (Kelley et al., 2002; Mitch-
ell et al., 2006). SOM increased with the strength of self and other
representations in area 9; its activity predicted both how much
self-judgments were related to the other player, and how much
other judgments were related to one’s own performance. This
suggests that area 9 does not simply represent other people’s
perspectives independently of our own (Amodio and Frith,
2006), but instead it represents self and others in an interdepen-
dent fashion.
RESULTS
Experiment Structure
On each trial, subjects performed a reaction-time minigame.
They were told that two other players independently performed
the minigame at the same time (Figures S1–S3). We explain
the nature of the minigames in detail in Figure S3. The mini-
games’ precise nature is less critical than the fact that they pro-other (O) was pre-specified on each trial but changed between trials. Ratings andm
cooperative or competitive context.
(B) Trial timeline for an example cooperative trial. Trials start with the presentation o
made about whether to cooperate or not (in this case the subject decided to coop
O-ability ratings. Then all players play a minigame (independent of choice or rating
disparity between the performance average of S and O (9) and the threshold they w
or negative.
(C) Trial timeline for an example competitive trial. Annotations in the figure panel in
choice ismade but now the decision is whether or not to compete. In this case, the
the performance difference of S and O (4) and the threshold (1).
(D) If subjects decided not to cooperate or to compete (avoid choices), they noneth
the context was still displayed (competitive in this example), but no threshold was
subjects either won or lost 1.5 points with equal probability (i.e., the expected v
cooperating or competing (depending on which context was indicated).
(E) Schematic of session timeline. Each trial is characterized by one of two oth
minigames (M1/M2) and has either a cooperative (Coop) or compete (Cmp) so
dorandomly interleaved.
484 Neuron 91, 482–493, July 20, 2016vided a vehicle to investigate how subjects developed an esti-
mate of their ability that was based on their performance and
how this changed depending on interactions with two other
players whose performances they also saw. On each trial in
the experiment, subjects performed a short trial of a minigame
and parametric feedback about their own performance and the
performance of the other players was provided at the end of
each trial (Figure 1A). Subjects could use the performance feed-
back to form ability estimates for self and the two others over the
course of the experiment.
We used pre-determined performance feedback schedules to
carefully match observed performance for self and others and to
keep them stable across subjects. This ensured that perfor-
mance learning for self and others were comparable and that in-
dividual differences in task behavior were interpretable. Subjects
were told that the performance feedback reflected their objec-
tive performance mapped on a 15-point performance scale
and that the previously established mapping was the same for
all players. Therefore, subjects received explicit and indepen-
dent performance feedback for all players. Using not only one
but two minigames (‘‘time task’’ and ‘‘color task’’) in pseudo-
random trial order made it possible to have, on the one hand,
slowly drifting performance shifts within a minigame (as abilities
are thought to be relatively stable features [Boorman et al., 2013])
but, on the other hand, reduced sequential correlations across
trials (by switching between minigames that were performed at
different levels; Figure 1E) and ensured a full parametric range
of performance feedback, thereby making it possible to perform
event-related fMRI analysis. Finally, having two minigames al-
lowed us to establish the generality of our findings.
Each trial was performed either in a cooperative or a compet-
itive context. For example, on some trials subjects were given
the opportunity to cooperate with one of two other players in
the next run of the minigame (Figure 1B). This meant that their
own performance score and the other player’s performance
score would be summed together, and if it exceeded a threshold
indicated on the screen (varying trialwise), then points were
awarded (which were translated into monetary reward at the
end of the experiment). Subjects could first decide whether to
engage in cooperation or whether to avoid it (engage/avoid de-
cision). If they avoided cooperation, then the points awardedinigames were embedded in engage/avoid decisions that established either a
f S, O, the upcomingminigame, social context, and the threshold. A decision is
erate). After the decision, subjects provided, in randomized order, S-ability and
s). In the feedback phase, the payoff (1 in this instance) is determined by the
ere asked to exceed (10). Payoffs were parametric and could be positive, zero,
dicate elements differing from the cooperative example in (B). Again, an engage
subject chose to compete. Payoff (+3) is determined by the difference between
eless went on tomake ratings and performminigames. In the feedback phase,
shown, and the payoff was independent of performance scores. On such trials,
alue was zero). Hence, choices should only depend on the expected value of
er players having the role of relevant other (O1/O2) and one of two possible
cial context. All three trial features were experimenter determined and pseu-
were randomly distributed around zero. The other player was
pre-specified on each trial and is referred to as ‘‘relevant other’’
(O) as opposed to the ‘‘self’’ (S). Specifying only one of the other
players asOon any given trial, and changing this from trial to trial,
also helped reduce sequential dependencies between perfor-
mance estimates on successive trials. Whether or not a subject
collaborates on any trial should depend on the subject’s esti-
mate of their own ability, their estimate of the other player’s abil-
ity, and the threshold that has to be reached.
On other trials, subjects were given the opportunity to
compete the relevant other, O, in the next run of the minigame
(Figure 1C). This meant that the difference between their own
performance score and the other player’s performance score
would be taken, and if it exceeded a threshold indicated on the
screen, then points were awarded. Subjects could first decide
whether to engage in competition or whether to avoid it
(engage/avoid decision). If they avoided competition then the
points awarded were randomly distributed around zero. Again,
which of the two other players was O varied from trial to trial.
And again, whether or not a subject competes should depend
on the subject’s estimate of their own ability, their estimate of
the other player’s ability, and the threshold score that has to
be reached.
In summary, the engage/avoid decision created either a coop-
erative or a competitive relationship between S andO;O became
either an ally or an opponent for S on that trial (Figures 1B and
1C). The context varied pseudorandomly across trials making
sure that slowly drifting ability estimates were comparable be-
tween competitive and cooperative trials. Importantly, the inclu-
sion of the engage/avoid decision and the threshold enabled us
to distinguish S and O related brain activity from brain activity
related to reward processing.
So that we could measure subjects’ absolute ability estimates,
subjects were asked on each trial to rate the performance they
expected for the current trial for themselves (S-ability) and the
relevant other (O-ability; Figures 1A–1C). S-ability and O-ability
were assessed via two independent ratings (in random order)
prior to performing the minigame. Having the ability ratings
embedded in either a cooperative or a competitive context al-
lowed us to test whether past performance of S and O had differ-
ential effects on theO-ability and S-ability, respectively. We used
ratings in which subjects rated the players relative to a rating
marker, which was updated over trials using a staircasing proce-
dure (see ‘‘Ability ratings’’ in Experimental Procedures) to maxi-
mize both informativeness and speed of the ratings (and there-
fore trial number and statistical power). The inclusion of two
different other players who took turns to be the relevant other
in a trial ensured that S’s and O’s performance feedback and
associated ability estimates were statistically decorrelated al-
lowing identification of neural correlates in an unconfounded
manner (Figure S5A).
Appropriate Ability Estimation and Self-OtherMergence
We analyzed rating and decision data using logistic general
linear models (GLMs) applied first to each subject separately
and then averaged resulting regression weights (beta weights)
across subjects (Figure 2). After testingwhether both ability judg-
ments in the rating data and engage/avoid choices were basedon the previous performances of the appropriate players, we
went on to investigate self-other mergence (Figure 2A).
First, we tested which information subjects used to estimate
self and others’ abilities. Analysis of the rating data showed
that S-ability and O-ability were based on the performance his-
tory of S and O, respectively. This indicates that subjects indeed
used performance feedback to generate predictions about their
subsequent minigame performance (Figures 2B-i and 2C-i).
Recent performance feedback was predictive of subjects S
and O ratings. However, performance that had occurred more
remotely in time had much less of an impact on the subjects’
ability estimates. This finding that recent and remote events
have greater and lesser impacts, respectively, is similar to the
finding that action value estimates are based more on recent
reward in reinforcement-type learning (Sutton and Barto,
1998). Therefore, to summarize the performance histories that
subjects had observed, we fitted a standard reinforcement
learning (RL) model individually for each subject (Supplemental
Experimental Procedures 1).S-performance andO-performance
from the RL models were estimates of expected performance
and represented recency-weighted averages of the performance
feedback (not the true performance) of S and O.
Next, we examined whether S-performance and O-perfor-
mance from the RL models predicted decisions to engage in
cooperation/competition. We found that a better S-performance
increased the likelihood of cooperating and competing, while
a better O-performance led to increased cooperation and
decreased competition (Figure 2D). The third factor, the
threshold that subjects had to exceed on each trial, not surpris-
ingly also influenced behavior; a higher threshold led to less
engagement in both cooperative and competitive contexts. As
incentivized by the experimental design, subjects’ engage rates
were around 70% (Figure 2D-ii), andwe found a slight preference
for cooperation compared to competition (t23 = 3.82; p < 0.01).
This preference might be related to the experiment’s payoff
structure. However, it is also consistent with suggestions that a
normative cooperative bias exists in social interactions promot-
ing cooperation over selfish behavior (Boyd and Richerson,
2009). This shows that choices when to cooperate and when
to compete, like the subjects’ ability ratings, were strongly based
on the previous performances of S and O. It also indicates that
our competition/cooperate manipulation had the expected
impact on subjects’ behavior: subjects preferred to cooperate
with high performers and to compete with low performers, as
they should indeed have done in order to maximize their reward
in the experiment.
Finally, we investigated whether subjects’ own ability esti-
mates were also related to O’s past performance. We focused
our analysis of SOM on trials where subjects chose to
engage in cooperation or competition. Controlling for S-perfor-
mance, we assessed the influence of O-performance on
S-ability. To do this, we tested whether, in a GLM which con-
tained factors indexing past performance of S, past performance
of O were predictive of subjects S-ability ratings. Specifically,
we tested whether S-ability judgments were indeed biased
toward the performance levels of O in cooperation, but
away from them in competition. We found that, indeed, during
cooperation S-ability increased and decreased in tandem withNeuron 91, 482–493, July 20, 2016 485
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Figure 2. Behavioral Results
Blue and red indicate cooperation and competition
trials in all panels.
(A) Schematic of appropriate ability estimation and
self-other mergence (SOM) (i). Letters on arrows
refer to subsequent panels showing analysis of
appropriate ability estimates (B-i and C-i) and SOM
effects (B-ii and C-ii). S-ability and O-ability refers
to trialwise ratings of oneself (S) and relevant other
(O). (ii) Illustration of a context-dependent SOM
effect where O’s past performance influences
S-ability estimates. S-ability estimates are inflated
or depressed when O’s performance history has
been, respectively, good or poor in cooperative
contexts. However, the inverse is the case in
competition: good performers decrease S-ability
estimates. Positive and negative beta weights
in B-ii (and analogously for O-ability in C-ii) reflect
the increasing and decreasing slopes in this
illustration.
(B and C) Agent appropriate estimation of ability in
(B-i) and (C-i): S-ability and O-ability on trial t were
based on recent S and O performance feedback,
respectively. Panels showbeta weights of a logistic
GLM, applied to each subject and averaged over
subjects (same for subsequent panels). Ratings
were more strongly based on the recent perfor-
mance feedback received by the appropriate
player (i.e., S-ability ratings reflect S’s past per-
formance and O-ability ratings reflect O’s past
performance). SOM of performance in (B-ii) and
(C-ii): we found an influence of O-performance on
S-ability, controlling for the effect of S-perfor-
mance. This effect reversed with social context
such that the estimation of one’s own ability was
either inflated (in cooperation) or depressed (in
competition) when paired with a high performer.
Similarly, S-performance influenced estimates of
O-ability, controlling for the influence of O-perfor-
mance (significant SOMint; p values for both ana-
lyses calculated in an interaction analysis from
Figure S4A; same y axes as in (i). Note that different
GLMs were used for (i) and (ii) (see main text and
Experimental Procedures).
(D) Engage/avoid decisions. (i) S-performance,
O-performance, and threshold influenced de-
cisions to cooperate or compete in a rational
manner. In particular, O is weighted in reverse
fashion depending on whether O is an ally in a
cooperative context or an opponent in a competi-
tive context. (ii) Rate of engage choices for coop-
erative (‘‘Coop.’’) and competitive (‘‘Comp.’’) trials
(error bars are mean ± SEM).O-performance: independent of subjects’ own performance,
subjects evaluated themselves more positively when the other
player performed well and more negatively when the other per-
formed badly. This was reversed in competition: subjects evalu-
ated themselves more negatively when competing with a high
compared to a low performer, as demonstrated by an interaction486 Neuron 91, 482–493, July 20, 2016effect (SOMint(O/S), t23 = 3.39; p = 0.0025; see Figure S4A for
full details and summary in Figure 2B-ii). We found O-ability was
influenced by S-performance in a complementary manner (SO-
Mint(S/O), t23 = 3.21; p = 0.0039; see Figure S4A for full details
and summary in Figure 2C-ii). The two SOM effects persisted
both when using estimates of S’s and O’s performance history
Table 1. Peak Coordinates of Significant Clusters in Whole-Brain
fMRI Contrasts
Contrast Region
Peak Coordinates
x/y/z (in mm MNI
Space) Z Value
S-performance Perigenual anterior
cingulate cortex (pgACC)
0 40 6 3.98
Precuneus 6 64 18 3.38
O-performance Brodmann area 9 2 44 36 3.43
Family-wise error cluster corrected, z > 2.5, p < 0.05.that were not based on RL models and also in analyses that
included the trials where subjects decided to avoid cooperation
or competition (even though on such trials the relation to Omight
be less important, Figures S4B and S4C). Therefore, ability esti-
mates for self and other were interdependent; SOM occurred
both when judging oneself and the other individual.Neural Correlates of Appropriate Ability Estimation and
Self-Other Mergence
In close correspondence to the behavioral analysis, we tested,
first, whether there were brain regions encoding ability estimates
for self and relevant other. Having identified such regions, we
went on to test whether self and other signals were related to
the appropriate attribution of past performance to the relevant
player (S-performance to S and O-performance to O) or whether
they indicated a misattribution between self and other. For all
MRI analyses, we used a single GLM (see Supplemental Exper-
imental Procedures 3.3 for details).
In order to identify regions tracking performance history, we
focused on the decision phase and used a GLM very similar to
the one used in the behavioral choice analysis (Figure S5; Table
1). This allowed us to distinguish between brain signals related to
the self, the relevant other, and the variable threshold subjects
had to exceed to win points on each trial (Figure S5A). Activity
in perigenual anterior cingulate cortex (pgACC) reflected sub-
jects’ own recent performance history (Figure 3A-i); it increased
and decreased depending on how well subjects had themselves
performed recently (and therefore how likely they are to perform
well on the next trial). This S-performance signal in pgACC did
not simply reflect individual choice values; it was present even
after partialing out reward expected on a given trial (Figures
S5B and S5C). Such an analysis was possible because the
experimental design meant that on any trial reward expectation
was only partly a function of S-performance (in addition it also
depended on the threshold and O-performance, in different
ways on cooperative and competitive trials).
In contrast, area 9 tracked O-performance history (Figure 3A-
ii; Figures S5B and S5C), reflecting how well the relevant other is
expected to perform in the minigames. Area 9 is part of the ‘‘the-
ory of mind’’ network (Saxe, 2006) and is active during other-
directed behavior (Sul et al., 2015). However, the effect ofO-per-
formance that we found in area 9 was a basic other performance
tracking signal and as such is unlikely to reflect only emotional or
motivational responses to the other player that vary as a function
of context. As such, the O-performance signal could be distin-guished from activity more generally related to O. For instance,
area 9 and other nodes of the ‘‘theory of mind’’ network were
also more active at the times when subjects rated the relevant
other (Figure S5B-ii). Overall, the pattern of performance related
signals was different in area 9 compared to pgACC (Figures S5C-
ii and S5C-iii).
In all subsequent analyses, we focused on the same two re-
gions of interest (ROIs) using the same GLM as used on the
whole-brain level (although based on the same trials as in the
behavioral analysis, Figures 2B-ii and 2C-ii) using time course
analysis. To relate brain signals to behavior, we employed a
two-step inference process considering only variables that
were related specifically to past performance. First, we assessed
whether an ROI carried a significant signal for a given regressor.
Second, only if this was the case, we tested whether individual
variation in the brain signal at the group peak was related to in-
dividual variation in behavior by correlating it with the respective
behavioral beta weight from the self or other rating. We began
by examining our main variables of interest: S-performance
and O-performance.
We found that S-performance signal in pgACC predicted how
much S-performance determined S-ability across subjects (Fig-
ure 3B-i; r = 0.55; p = 0.0053). Hence, pgACC signals reflected
the use of information for estimating one’s own abilities, inde-
pendent of others. We found no other performance related rep-
resentations of self and other in pgACC.
In contrast to pgACC, the O-performance signal in area 9
did not predict how much ability estimates of O were guided by
O-performance (r = 0.07; p = 0.74). Instead, it predicted the de-
gree to which subjects’ S-ability decreased as a function of
engaging with a strong other player (Figure 3B-ii; r = 0.48; p =
0.0177). Thismeans that subjectswith a stronger neural represen-
tation of the relevant other’s past performance in area 9 rated their
own ability more negatively the better the relevant other performs.
At a behavioral level, this corresponded to the tendency forO-per-
formance to have a negative main effect on S-ability (the average
effect of the two bars in Figures 2B-ii and S4A). The generally
negative effect of O-performance on S-ability becomes apparent
when considering only subjects with the strongest O-perfor-
mance signals in area 9 (t11 =2.5; p = 0.0293; Figure 3B-ii, right;
median split of subjects). Therefore, area 9 activity reflected SOM
in the estimation of the abilities of oneself.
To investigate whether area 9 was generally related to SOM,
we examined whether such an effect was also present in the
other direction: that past S-performance was used to estimate
O-ability. In addition to O-performance signals, area 9 also car-
ried an S-performance signal that was stronger in competition
than in cooperation (interaction effect; t23 = 2.93; p = 0.008; Fig-
ure 3A-iii). This was consistent with our finding that area 9 was
generally more active when there was a competitive relationship
between S andO thanwhen there was a cooperative relationship
(main effect of context; Figure S5B-iii). We went on to test
whether these self-related performance representations were
also linked to SOM. Indeed, we found that S-performance influ-
enced O-ability via area 9: the neural S-performance effect in
area 9 (Figure 3A-iii) was predictive of the influence exerted by
S-performance on O-ability shown in Figure 2C-ii (Figure 3B-iii;
r = 0.43; p = 0.0341). In other words, the neural signature ofNeuron 91, 482–493, July 20, 2016 487
A B Figure 3. fMRI Results
Whole-brain effects family-wise error cluster cor-
rected, z > 2.5, p < 0.05.
(A) Activation foci for S-performance in pgACC (i,
yellow) and O-performance in area 9 (ii, blue). Area
9 showedmore diverse social signals; a contextual
S-performance signal was observed, which was
stronger in competition than in cooperation (iii).
The beta time course shows the context-depen-
dent difference in S-performance (red line in-
dicates signal group peak where beta weights
were taken for correlations with behavior).
(B) Relationship between neural and behavioral
effects. (i) In pgACC, across-subjects variability in
S-performance signal reflected the influence of
S-performance on S-ability. (ii, left) By contrast,
variation in area 9 O-performance signal was
not related to the degree subjects based O-ability
on O-performance; instead, it predicted the
average influence of O-performance on S-ability
(SOMmain(O/S)). Note the behavioral variable
plotted on the ordinate corresponds to the average
effect (across cooperation and competition) of
O-performance on S-ability (see Figure 2B-ii). (ii,
right) In other words, only subjects with high
O-performance signal showed a negative effect of
O-performance on S-ability (median split; same y
axis as on the left). (iii, left) The strength of the
contextual S-performance effect in area 9 (A-iii)
predicted the degree to which O-ability was influ-
enced by S-performance in a context-dependent
manner (SOMint(S/O) from Figure 2C-ii on y axis).
(iii, right) Again, only subjects with higher S-per-
formance interaction signals showed the corre-
sponding behavioral effect of S-performance on
O-ability (median split; same y axis as on the left)
(error bars are mean ± SEM).S-performance in area 9 was different depending on context,
and this difference predicted the context-dependent effect of
S-performance on O-ability (SOMint(S/O)).
In sum, we found that, at a first approximation, self and other
signals were found in distinct brain regions (pgACC and area 9),
but further investigation revealed area 9 contained more diverse
social signals relating also to oneself but within the social
context. We found two SOM effects in area 9 that indicate that
it is those subjects with stronger self and other related activity
that are prone to SOM (Figures 3B-ii and 3B-iii, right panels, sta-
tistics embedded in figure). The findings were specific to area 9
(Figure S5C). Therefore, the stronger the representation of the
other in area 9, the more the judgment of one’s own ability de-
pended also on the other’s performance; analogously, the
strength of area 9 self-related representations predicted how
much they influenced the estimation of other’s abilities.
Behavioral Adjustments Driven by Self-Other Mergence
in Area 9
Finally, we investigated whether self-other mergence had an
impact beyond the subjective estimates of abilities reported by
subjects and tested whether its influence even propagated to
behavior, and, if so, whether such an effect could also be related
to area 9.488 Neuron 91, 482–493, July 20, 2016We used the trial wise change in subjects’ performance,
regardless of direction (S-pChange; Figure 4A) as an index of
feedback driven behavior strategy adjustment from one trial
involving a given minigame to the next trial with the same mini-
game. Note that S-pChange refers to the change in true perfor-
mance, whereas S-performance andO-performance summarize
the performance feedback observed. Subjects changed their
performance in the minigames (for better or worse) more after
negative performance feedback for S (t23 = 2.34, p = 0.0281).
However, they also changed their performance more after nega-
tive feedback for O in cooperative trials, while in competition they
changed their performance more after more positive feedback
for O (O-influence on S-pChange; t23 = 2.25, p = 0.0346; see Fig-
ure S6 for full details and summary in Figure 4B). This means that
the performance feedback, displayed for the relevant other after
a minigame, had an impact on how subjects performed the mini-
game themselves when they encountered it the next time. There-
fore, subjects used the performance feedback pertaining to the
other to adjust their own behavior.
We tested whether this behavioral SOM effect was again
mediated by area 9 using an ROI analysis (coordinates taken
from previous analysis). This final part of the analyses was spe-
cifically intended as a replication of previous SOM effects. We
used the same GLM as before, focusing on the feedback phase
AC D
B Figure 4. Self-Other Mergence in Minigame
Performance Adjustments
(A) Illustration of S-pChange reflecting the absolute
(i.e., unsigned) difference in true minigame per-
formance from one trial to the next of the same
minigame. S-pChange constitutes an index of how
much subjects changed their true minigame per-
formance as a function of performance feedback.
(B) Subjects’ performance adjustments were
guided by their own performance feedback.
S-pChange increased with more negative perfor-
mance feedback (see main text). However,
O performance feedback exerted an additional
influence on S-pChange. It influenced S-pChange
in a manner that paralleled its influence on S-ability
(Figure 2; p value from Figure S6A).
(C) BOLD activity in area 9 in the feedback
phase of trials was related to the magnitude of
S-pChange that would ensue from the current to
the next trial (main effect). It also scaled negatively
with a prediction error for O (O-PE). ROI taken from
Figure 3A-ii.
(D) Subjects with stronger (more negative) O-PE in area 9 were more influenced by O performance feedback in their subsequent minigame performance (left). As
in the earlier results, SOM occurred only in subjects with stronger area 9 signal (median split; same y axis as on the left) (error bars are mean ± SEM).this time (Figure S5D). Again, we first aimed to identify activity
related to the relevant other’s performance in area 9 and only
subsequently to relate such activity to how much subjects
were biased by the other player. First, we tested whether area
9 could play a role in preparing behavioral adjustments from trial
to trial. We found that, indeed, in the feedback phase of the trial,
activity in area 9 was correlated with the extent that subjects
changed their performance from the current trial to the next trial
(main effect S-pChange; Figure 4C). Second, at the same time,
we found a negative signal scaling with the size of the (signed)
prediction error for the relevant other (O-PE; Figure 4C). O-PE in-
dexed how much the observed performance feedback for O
deviated from subjects’ expectation of O’s performance level
(Suzuki et al., 2012). Third, variation in O-PE signal predicted
variation in O-influence on S-pChange (Figure 4D; r = 0.43, p =
0.0369). This replicates our previous findings linking area 9 to
self-other mergence: the strength of other-related performance
signals in area 9 predicted how much subjects’ adjusted their
own performance as a function of the other player’s performance
feedback.
DISCUSSION
People learn about themselves from objective experience (Ban-
dura, 1977), but their judgments are also deeply influenced by
the social environment (Allport, 1924; Festinger, 1954). In our
experiment, we show that both mechanisms occur when
learning about the abilities of self and others. Subjects form es-
timates of how well they themselves and others do based on
explicit performance feedback. However, these estimates are
not separate but influence each other reciprocally. Subjects sys-
tematically overestimated their abilities when cooperating with a
good partner compared to a bad one, and the reverse was true in
competition. Also, others were estimated as more similar in abil-
ity to oneself in cooperation but dissimilar to oneself in competi-tion. Such interdependence could be described as ‘‘anchoring’’
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) self and other judgments to each
other in cooperation but as the reverse in competition. Two adja-
cent areas in medial prefrontal cortex, pgACC and area 9, track
self and other performance, respectively. Area 9 moreover inte-
grated multiple signals relating also to the self and the context,
and it predicted the degree to which self and other abilities
were estimated in an interdependent fashion.
PgACC signals tracked subjects’ own performance. This area
was previously found when subjects judged whether a given trait
related to themselves (Denny et al., 2012; Kelley et al., 2002) and
when mentalizing about oneself and similar other people (Mitch-
ell et al., 2006) even when controlling for the effects of likeability
(Mobbs et al., 2009). In our study, pgACC activity increased and
decreased according to how well subjects thought they would
perform in the experiment (S-performance signal; Figure 3). For
subjects with a stronger S-performance signal in pgACC, perfor-
mance history more strongly governed estimates of their own
ability. Activity in other brain areas has been associated with ac-
tion values, but our findings indicate that activity in pgACC re-
flects the assignment of ability, or a general value, to the self
rather than the value of a particular choice (Figures S5B and
S5C). Such representations in pgACC might be used to predict
whether one is capable of succeeding in a given endeavor (Ban-
dura, 1977) and as such might be subjectively perceived as
rewarding in themselves. This idea is consistent with recent
findings that regions in anterior cingulate cortex are related to
the physical costs monkeys are willing to endure in order to
obtain reward (Amemori and Graybiel, 2012). Moreover, such
value assignments to the self (rather than value assignment to
specific choices) may be altered in psychological syndromes
such as depression (Murray et al., 2011). Note also that using
predetermined and well-controlled performance feedback was
critical for our investigation of feedback-guided ability learning
as it decoupled feedback-guided learning about oneself fromNeuron 91, 482–493, July 20, 2016 489
Figure 5. Self-Other Mergence and Interdependent Self and Other
Representations in Area 9
In our study, pgACC holds a representation of oneself that is related to
observing one’s own performance (Figure 3). It may reflect the value of one’s
own actions for earning future reward or overcoming challenges. This ability
estimate may be lower or higher depending on the state the individual is in
(indicated by smaller and bigger ‘‘S’’). In contrast, signals in dorsomedial area 9
suggest a different function. Area 9 holds a representation of the self, too;
however, it is embedded in the cooperative or competitive context (Figure 3A-
iii). In addition, it integrates information about the ability of others (Figure 3A-ii)
and the social relationship one has with them (Figure S5B-iii). A neural circuit
that integrates such information might be useful to facilitate coordination be-
tween oneself and others and allow, for instance, the pursuit of shared goals. It
might also be used to flexibly compute one’s statuswithin one’s social network
as circumstances change (blue and red connections indicate changing alli-
ances and rivalries, varying in strength). This would enable humans and ani-
mals to assign values to self and others based on the dynamics of their social
relationship—something that very vividly guides choice in the complex
dominance hierarchies of monkeys. If this is the case, then self-other
mergence might accompany these neural processes in area 9 (Figure 3)
occurring as a byproduct of relational self and other representations held by
this brain region.introspective (meta-cognitive) estimation of one’s own abilities
(Bahrami et al., 2010; De Martino et al., 2013).
In contrast to pgACC, area 9 signals were more complex.
There were clear signals relating to representation of the other.
For example area 9 was active at the time point that subjects
made ratings of the relevant other and more specifically it
tracked other-related performance estimates and prediction er-
rors (Figures 3 and 4). Activity in area 9 has been found frequently
in previous studies when trait judgments were made about other
people (Denny et al., 2012) and mentalizing about dissimilar
others (Mitchell et al., 2006). In our study there were, however,
also signals relating to self and the social relationship with the
other. Individual differences in area 9 activity indicated how
much self/other information was used in a relational way, pre-
dicting SOM both toward the self and toward the other.
This sheds light on the function area 9 may have in social
cognition. Self-othermergencemight reflect difficulties that arise
from tracking and assigning both self- and other-related informa-
tion to the appropriate agent. In this sense, the effects we report
are reminiscent of failures of credit assignment to the appro-
priate choice during reward-guided learning (Chau et al., 2015;
Thorndike, 1911, 1933; Walton et al., 2010). However, self-other
mergencemay also be a side-product of relational computations
in area 9 (Figure 5). In our experiment, the cooperative and490 Neuron 91, 482–493, July 20, 2016competitive contexts create a social relationship between self
and other that subjects need to be aware of. This meant that ex-
pectations of success in a trial were not a result of one’s own
anticipated performance alone, but they were also dependent
on the predicted performance of another player as well. Taking
into account the actions of oneself in concert with another per-
son’s actions is not a trivial matter (Tomasello et al., 2005), and
it has been argued that coordinating actions between self and
other often relies on implicit agreements (Misyak et al., 2014).
It might be that self-other mergence indexes the relational repre-
sentations that are used in many social situations where out-
comes are the consequence of joint actions (Seo et al., 2014),
possibly even if oneself is only a passive observer. From this
perspective, when cooperating with a weak partner, the reduced
chances of achieving a shared goal as a team might be carried
over to impact negatively on one’s judgment of oneself. Note,
however, that the strength of the direction of influence of self-
other mergence (self to other or other to self) may depend on
the social situation and other constraints. Furthermore, area 9
may integrate self, other, and relational information to compute
one’s own position in a social network when an individual’s sta-
tus is a reflexion of its alliances (Schu¨lke et al., 2010). In mon-
keys, area 9 is related to dominance (Neubert et al., 2015;
Noonan et al., 2014; Sallet et al., 2011), and thus adoption of a
place in a social hierarchy might reflect the operation of a rela-
tional mechanism that could be performed in area 9.EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Subjects
Twenty-six subjects participated in the experiment. Two were excluded from
data analysis due to excessive motion (final sample: 24 subjects; nine female;
aged 19–31). All provided informed consent. The study was approved by the
ethics committee of the University of Oxford (MSD-IDREC-C1-2013-133).
Subjects received £35 as a show-up fee and a bonus based on task perfor-
mance (range: £4.50–£11.80).
Experimental Design and Schedule
While lying in the MRI scanner, on each trial, subjects performed a minigame.
They were led to believe that two other subjects played the same minigame
simultaneously (Figure 1; Figures S1–S3). Each trial took place either in a coop-
erative or in a competitive social context. Subjects thenmade an engage/avoid
decision. On some trials, the choice was between cooperating or refraining
from cooperating, while in other trials the choice was between competing or
refraining from competing. If subjects took the ‘‘avoid’’ choice, then that meant
that they were simply awarded a small number of points (1.5 points) randomly
distributed around zero (and they were informed that this was the case). How-
ever, if they took the ‘‘engage’’ decision in the cooperative context, then they
opted to ally themselves with one of the other players (which one varied from
trial to trial and was indicated by the experimenter on each trial and is subse-
quently referred to as the relevant other, O) to see whether together they could
performwell enough for their average points to exceed a threshold level (which
varied from trial to trial). If they did, they gained reward points on that trial, but if
they fell short of the threshold they lost points. By contrast, if they took the
‘‘engage’’ decision in the competitive context, then the other player became
an opponent. The difference between the subject’s and opponent’s perfor-
mances then had to exceed a threshold (again the threshold was variable),
and the payoff was proportional to this difference (i.e., a win, a loss or neither
of the two). In summary, the social context was critical when decisions to
engage were made. Reward outcomes for engage/avoid choices were deter-
mined by minigame performances of S, O, and a threshold that varied unpre-
dictably from trial to trial.
Engage PayoffCompetition = ðfeedbackS  feedbackOÞ  threshold
(Equation 1a)
Engage PayoffCooperation = ðfeedbackS + feedbackOÞ=2 threshold
(Equation 1b)
‘‘Feedback’’ in Equations 1a and 1b refers to performance feedback. The
timing of events within each trial is illustrated in Figure 1.
While the likely performance feedback for S and O could be estimated from
performance feedback on previous trials, the threshold varied unpredictably
from trial to trial and was used to dissociate reward expectation from perfor-
mance expectation and to make sure that subjects did not make their choices
before the beginning of the current trial. Subjects found the meaning of the
thresholds intuitive when the task was being explained to them, and their
task behavior confirmed that they had understood the task.
Subjects then also provided an estimate of their ability on each trial by rating
the expected performance for themselves (S) and the relevant other (O) for the
upcoming trial of the minigame (Figure S2B). The order of S and O ratings was
randomized across trials. As explained above, although both of the two other
players performed the minigame simultaneously, subjects were only paired (to
compete or cooperate) with one of the other players (the relevant other, O).
Therefore, only O, and not the third player, was relevant for a trial’s engage/
avoid decision. However, the identity of O switched between trials. On each
trial, after the minigame, subjects received performance feedback about
themselves as well as about the performances of the other two players (Fig-
ure S2A). As minigames, we designed two short reaction-time-based tasks.
See Figure S3 for details on the minigames. The goal of the subjects in the
experiment was to collect as many rewards (points) as possible, as these
were translated into monetary reward at the end of the experiment.
For all three players, including the subjects themselves, performance feed-
back on every trial was predefined (Figure S1A). In other words, the feedback
about performance was independent from subjects’ actual performance in the
minigames (see, however, ‘‘false-start trials’’ for a case of veridical perfor-
mance feedback in the ‘‘Feedback’’ section of the Experimental Procedures
and Figure S2C). This was necessary to control and match performance feed-
back between subjects as well as between subjects and the two other players.
Subjects were told that the minigames had been tested on a larger sample of
subjects and that performance feedback in the minigame reflected individual
performance relative to that sample.
In the phases before and after the minigames, three scales ranging from 1 to
15 points were shown with the initials of the three players below. Performance
feedback was displayed on these scales in the feedback phase. While the ini-
tials of the confederates were the same for all experimental sessions, the sub-
jects’ own initials were adjusted to be appropriate for each individual subject.
The initials created a social frame for the experiment without using explicitly
social cues such as faces.
The experimental schedule contained 136minigame trials. The design was a
2(social context)3 2(partner)3 2(minigame) fully crossed design (17 trials per
cell). This meant that a trial could be either cooperative or competitive (social
context: cooperation or competition), the O could be either ‘‘player’’ 1 or 2 (O:
Other1 or Other2), and, in each trial, subjects played one of two minigames
(minigame: time task or color task). The trial type order was pseudorandom
and the same for all subjects. Three subjects performed a marginally short-
ened version of the schedule. They did the first 116 trials of the schedule; how-
ever, the design was still fully crossed (14 trials per cell).
Several features of the experiment were counterbalanced independently
across subjects to avoid confounds. The mapping between minigame (time
task or color task), and associated performance feedback schedule was coun-
terbalanced. Moreover, as the left/right sides of the buttons used to indicate
the engage/avoid choice were fixed for each subject, they were counterbal-
anced across subjects. We also counterbalanced the screen location where
initials of each confederate were displayed (left or right of subjects’ initials,
which were always in the middle), and association between confederates
(whom the subjects had met before going into the scanner) and their perfor-
mance feedback schedules.
Thus, in summary, all trials comprised an engage/avoid decision, two binary
ratings (for S and O), a minigame phase (described in detail in Figure S3), and afeedback phase. Timing details for all phases (except minigame phases) are
shown in Figure S2.
Experimental Procedures
The experimental procedure was precisely scripted and involved two experi-
menters, two confederates, and the radiographer to make subjects believe
they would be playing an interactive game together with two other subjects.
The same twoconfederates pretended to be the twoother players for every sub-
ject. Details about the task instructions are presented in Figure S1B. The task in
the MRI scanner took approximately 55 min. After functional and structural MRI
sessions, subjects filled in two short questionnaires and were then fully de-
briefed about the experiment. No subject indicated any suspicion about false
performance feedback or the identity of the confederates before debriefing.
Supporting results from a debriefing questionnaire are shown in Figure S1C.
Note that we have several indications (and no counter-indications) that sub-
jects’ ability estimates were guided by the performance feedback and there-
fore that subjects found the feedback credible: the effects of past performance
feedback on (1) S-ability and O-ability ratings, (2) on decisions to engage in
cooperation/competition (both Figure 2), (3) on true minigame performance
(Figure 4), and (4) subjects’ self-reports of the feedback credibility in a debrief-
ing interview, documented by a debriefing questionnaire (Figure S1).
Ability Ratings
As already mentioned subjects provided S and O ability ratings. For each rat-
ing, initially, a tick indicated a value on the performance scale (rating marker)
and subjects indicated whether expected performance (for S or O as appro-
priate) would surpass or fall below the rating marker (Figure S2B). A positive
rating (i.e., performance is expected to be above the rating marker) was
made with one button, and a negative rating (i.e., performance is expected
to be below the rating marker) was made with the other button. As perfor-
mance feedback was always expressed in integers, the rating makers were al-
ways set between two integers (X.5 values). The rating marker was updated
from trial to trial based on the rating choices for the respective player using
a staircasing procedure to increase sensitivity of the ratings. A positive rating
resulted in an increase of the rating marker’s value by one point in the next trial
of the same minigame for the given player; a negative rating resulted in a
decrease by one point. The value of the rating marker on the first trial after
the starter trials (see below) was based on the player’s mean performance
feedback in the starter trials.
Subjects received a small payoff for the accuracy of the ratings. To reduce
incentives to perform badly on the minigames, negative ratings never yielded
payoffs. For positive ratings, subjects won or lost 0.25 points depending on
whether the subsequent performance feedback received surpassed or fell
below the ratingmarker. Note that themagnitude of the rating payoff was insig-
nificant compared to the payoff for the engage/avoid decision.
Feedback
Feedback was chunked together in three components that were presented in
randomized order. The first component was the performance feedback for S
and O, which was presented simultaneously with the information about the ac-
curacy of the subjects’ ratings (Figure S2B). The second component was the
payoff of the engage/avoid decision. For this, a cue indicating the trial’s choice
appeared on the right side of the screen (Figure S2A) together with circles rep-
resenting coins that were won (yellow circles with a plus sign) or lost (red
circles with a minus sign). At the same time, only for engage choices, the per-
formance feedback average (cooperation trials) or performance feedback dif-
ference (competition trials) was displayed on the scales on the right side of the
screen. The third component was the performance feedback of the other
player that was not the O (irrelevant other). The initials of this player were dis-
played in a different color, and the performance was irrelevant for any payoff.
The three feedback components appeared in random order to control for
sequence effects. The first component occurred after 1 s, the second compo-
nent 1.25 s later, the third component another 1.25 s later, and the feedback
phase ended after a further 4 s. Then, after 0.5- to 2.5-s inter-trial interval
(ITI) with a blank screen, the next trial started.
Two types of trials deviated from the described structure. First, the first four
trials of the experiment were ‘‘starter trials’’ (twowith the time task, twowith theNeuron 91, 482–493, July 20, 2016 491
in color task). Those trials were for subjects to form initial ability estimates
about the players. For this reason, in starter trials, there was no option to coop-
erate or compete, and no ability ratings were made. Second, for trials where
subjects performed very badly in a minigame (‘‘false starts’’), the feedback
phase was adjusted. The performance thresholds for false-start trials are dis-
cussed in Figure S3. In false-start trials, subjects received no performance
feedback for themselves, but only for the other players (Figure S2C; Figure S6B
shows the number of false-start trials per subject). The sole payoff for false-
start trials was a loss of two points independent of subjects’ ratings and
engage/avoid choice. Subjects were instructed about this. It was explained
that extremely bad performances would be detected by the computer running
the experiment and discarded as false starts to sort out performance slips that
were, for instance, due to inattentiveness and did not reflect a player’s ‘‘true’’
performance. This procedure was used to make the pre-determined feedback
in other trials more believable as the feedback in false-start trials was actually
determined by true minigame performance. Note that subjects were also told
during the instructions that there would be a special type of false-start trial if
one of the other players performed very badly. However, this never happened
in the experiment. Starter trials and the feedback phase of false-start trials
were excluded from fMRI analysis.
Reinforcement Learning Model
See Supplemental Experimental Procedures 1 for details on the RL model.
Behavioral Analysis
See Supplemental Experimental Procedures 2 for details on behavioral data
analysis.
Imaging Analyses
See Supplemental Experimental Procedures 3 and Figure S5 for details onMRI
data acquisition and analysis.SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Supplemental Information includes Supplemental Experimental Procedures,
six figures, and one table and can be found with this article online at http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2016.06.022.
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Supplemental data items:  
 
 
Figure S1 (relating to Figure 1) 
Performance feedback schedules, instruction and debriefing questionnaire. (A) Performance 
feedback was predetermined to guarantee that self and relevant other (S and O, respectively) 
performance feedback allowed a meaningful data analysis. The performance feedback for S and O was 
similar in mean and variance. However, very bad minigame performance did lead to veridical 
performance feedback (see false start trials in Experimental Procedures). Subjects performed one of 
two minigames on each trial and S performance feedback was more positive in one minigame 
compared to the other minigame (counterbalanced across subjects), while variance in S performance 
feedback was similarly small in both minigames. This was done to sample a wide range of S 
performance feedback while still keeping S performance feedback relatively stable within each 
minigame. The same logic applied to the performance feedback schedules of the two other players. In 
short, mean, variance and slow drifts of performance feedback were balanced for self and others to 
ensure that differential behavioral and neural effects were not driven by schedule differences. The 
relevant other (O) in a trial was Other 1 in half of the trials and Other 2 in the other half. Trials with 
minigame 1 and minigame 2 were pseudorandomly interleaved. (B) The experimental procedure and 
instructions followed a precise schedule. Two confederates arrived in the laboratory at a similar time as 
the subjects. Subjects had been told in advance that the experiment investigates learning and decision 
making in social situations and that two other naïve subjects would participate in the same experiment. 
After a short introduction, subjects were separated from the confederates and instructed about the 
experimental task. They were told that they would be playing an interactive game together with the 
confederates, who would play the game from computers outside the scanner room. A faked lottery was 
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used to determine who of the three alleged subjects went in the scanner. For approximately 45 minutes, 
subjects were instructed on the minigames, the ratings and the engage/avoid decisions and performed 
example trials. The instructions were designed such that actual performance learning would only take 
place in the subsequent experiment to maximize learning effects in the scanner. To still guarantee 
familiarity with the minigames, a written explanation of the two minigames was complemented with a 
short practice session, in which subjects performed 5 trials of each minigame (B-i). During those trials, 
the experimenter was present and made sure that subjects understood the minigames. No explicit 
performance feedback was given on those trials to avoid performance learning. To guarantee that 
subjects understood the logic of the engage/avoid decision and the ratings, subjects performed 16 
example trials that did not include minigames, but instead a placeholder screen (B-ii). This allowed 
subjects to adjust to the trial events and experience the reward outcomes of ratings and decisions. 
Importantly, the performance feedback on those trials followed no across-trial contingencies and 
consisted mostly of the highest or lowest performance feedback for the players. This was done to make 
these example trials very different from the trials experienced in the main experiment. Although 
subjects could not learn anything during those trials and therefore could make no well-grounded 
decisions, they were asked to invent and verbalize reasons for their ratings and decisions so that the 
experimenter could make sure that they understood their logic (e.g. "This is a cooperate trial. I press 
the "engage" button, because although the threshold is high, I think we will perform very well. I rate 
myself and the other one positively, because I think we will both perform well...").  In sum, subjects 
practiced all aspects of the experimental task, but in such a manner that they could not yet learn about 
their performance. Subjects were told that their goal in the experiment was to collect as many points as 
possible and that points would be translated into monetary reward at the end of the experiment.  It was 
emphasized that points could be earned by making good decisions and by providing accurate ratings of 
performance. Despite the substantial time needed for a thorough instruction, most subjects found the 
task intuitive and both the behavioral data acquired in the experiment (see main text) and a post-
experiment questionnaire confirmed that they understood the task. See question 5 in panel C: 22 
subjects gave a 7 out of 7 rating for the question "I have understood the instructions to the task" (the 
remaining 2 subjects gave 6 out of 7).  (C) After the experiment, subjects filled in a debriefing 
questionnaire with several questions that they rated on scales which were anchored for highest and 
lowest performance scores (see figure). These data showed that across the whole sample, subjects did 
not rate their overall performance in the two minigames differently (item 1; paired t-test: t23=0.13; 
p=0.9;). This was expected as we counterbalanced across subjects whether time task or color task was 
used as minigame 1 which had higher performance feedback on average compared to minigame 2 (see 
upper left panel in (A); for 11 of 24 subjects the time task was used as minigame 1). Note also that 
there was no confound in the ordering of minigames because trials of minigame 1 and minigame 2 
were interleaved across the whole experiment. When we retrospectively recoded item 1 with respect to 
minigame 1 and minigame 2, we found that subjects rated themselves better in the minigame where 
they received better performance feedback (item 1*; t23=7.72; p=7.7*10-8). Note that the performance 
scores for item 1 and 1* are very similar to the actual average performance feedback (see panel (A)) 
indicating further that subjects learned from the performance feedback. To confirm the believability of 
the performance feedback, we asked subject whether they felt that the performance feedback was 
accurate. If subjects experienced a mismatch between their subjective experience and the performance 
feedback they received, this would have been indicated by “disagree” ratings. We found slight 
agreement, however, indicating that subjects were unable to tell the inaccuracy of the performance 
feedback from their subjective experience. Additional suspicion checks asked whether they tried to 
perform better than O in competition (indicating that they believed that they could gain positive 
performance feedback by trying hard; item 3) and if positive performance feedback was valuable for 
them (item 4). In all cases (items 2,3,4) subjects tended to agree rather than disagree (average scores 
higher than scale point 4). This suggests that subjects indeed experienced the performance feedback as 
a consequence of their actions in the minigames. Note, importantly, that in addition to the debriefing 
questionnaire, a debriefing interview took place for every subject with additional suspicion checks. As 
we handed out this questionnaire before debriefing, to avoid biased responses, we could only indirectly 
ask if subjects had suspicions about the deception used. Therefore, we conducted debriefing interviews 
to fully disclose the purpose and method of the experiment to subjects, but also to confirm that all 
subjects, without exception, indicated that they believed the false performance feedback and had no 
doubts about the identity of the confederates. (error bars are mean +/-SEM across subjects).  
		
 
Figure S2 (relating to Figure 1) 
Trial structure. (A) For an example trial, we show the first part of the trial in which the social context 
(competition or cooperation) was revealed, participants made the engage/avoid decision, and provided 
self (S) and relevant other (O) ratings (i). The feedback phase is shown of the same example trial (in 
ii). For illustration purposes, the same performance feedback is shown in a cooperative context (upper 
rows) and a competitive context (lower rows). Note that timing of the events are shown in brackets and 
RT (reaction time) means that the respective step only ends when the subject makes a response. (A-i) 
At the beginning of a trial S (initials of the subject), O (initials of one of the two other players relevant 
for the current trial), social context (cooperation or competition) and type of upcoming minigame 
("Colour" or "Time") is presented. The initials of the irrelevant other player are not shown and the 
social context is color-coded indicating also the threshold of the current trial. In these examples, the 
choices made (see highlighted tick and cross in step 4) are to engage in cooperation (indicating the 
expectation that S and O will, on average, perform better than the threshold of 10) and to avoid 
competition (indicating that the subject does not expect to perform at least one point better than the O). 
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After the engage/avoid choices, binary ratings of S and O take place (step 4 to 6) in randomized order 
(in these examples, O rating first in cooperation and S rating first in competition). The ratings shown 
here indicate that the subject expects himself or herself to perform worse than 10.5, while the O is 
expected to perform better than 8.5 (see panel (B) for color coding of rating ticks). Note that these 
ratings are consistent with the engage/avoid choices shown in the two examples. (A-ii) In the feedback 
phase, the previous screen from before the minigame reappears. However, the right side of the screen 
showing the cooperation/competition threshold is occluded if a subject had chosen to avoid 
cooperation/competition in the previous decision phase of the trial. This means that in this example 
trial the threshold is only shown again in the cooperate trial (because the subject actually decided to 
cooperate) and not in the compete trial (because in this example trial the subject refrained from 
competing). In other words, the repeated presentation of the threshold is not a feature of the social 
context, but entirely a consequence of the engage/avoid choice made. Subsequently, three feedback 
components appear in randomized order to control for sequence effects (see legend on the right hand 
side). In cooperation, the choice payoff is -1, because the average performance is 9 while the threshold 
is 10. In competition, the choice payoff is -1.5 which is due to chance (payoff from avoid choices is 
+1.5 or -1.5 with a 50/50 probability) and independent of performance feedback. Note that the subject 
would have earned a payoff of 3 had the engage choice been taken (performance feedback difference of 
+4 minus threshold of +1). See panel (B) for an explanation of the rating payoff. Note that, overall, the 
magnitude of the rating payoff is marginal compared to the engage/avoid choice payoff. (B) Rationale 
of binary ratings. Before the minigame, subjects indicated for S and O either a positive or a negative 
rating reflecting the expectation that the player would surpass or fall below a given rating marker. The 
color change of the rating marker was indicative of the choice made. The rating marker turned black 
for a positive rating and grey for a negative rating. A positive rating led to a win or loss of 0.25 points 
depending on subsequent performance feedback. A negative rating led to no change in the points count 
independent of performance feedback. Therefore, making a correct negative rating was associated with 
a benefit of avoiding losing points while making a correct positive rating was associated with a benefit 
of winning 0.25 points. Note that in panel (A-ii), the performance and rating feedback indicate an 
incorrect negative rating (missed win) for S and an incorrect positive rating (loss) for O. Red text in 
quotes is taken from the subjects' instructions where a similar illustration was used. (C) The screenshot 
shows the feedback screen of a false start trial. In false start trials, the true performance of the subject 
in the minigame was below a predetermined threshold for acceptable performances. False start trials 
were a case of veridical performance feedback to ensure that performance feedback in general was 
believable. The feedback phase in false start trials was not analyzed and no prediction error for S was 
calculated on those trials (reward prediction error and prediction error for others were calculated as 
normal). Subjects were instructed about false start trials.  
		
 
Figure S3 (relating to Figure 1) 
Minigame description. We used two minigames in the experiment labeled "time task" and "colour 
task". The minigames were necessary prerequisites to administer performance feedback on every trial. 
They were short reaction-time based tasks and we designed them to be relatively non-transparent in the 
sense that the subjective experience of performing the minigames was not very informative for 
estimating one's ability compared to the explicit performance feedback that was given to the subjects. 
Also, we varied the timing parameters of the minigames to make it harder to compare true performance 
across different trials of a minigame. Lastly, we designed both minigames so that they appeared to be 
measuring different skills to make it plausible for subjects that performance levels in one task were not 
predictive of performance level in the other task. Each minigame was performed with one response 
button press with the right index finger. (A) The color task is loosely based on perceptual decision 
making tasks (Michael et al., 2014). Two pairs of squares, one pair red on the left, one pair blue on the 
right of a fixation cross, initially appear on screen. Then, the squares gradually change color over 
several seconds until the pairs have reversed their color. The color change occurs at an uneven rate. 
Subjects were asked to press a button when both pairs of squares had the same average color. The 
average colors were defined in RGB space as: 
  
 
 
The colors were controlled by two parameters cred and cblue. For the left, initially red ([1 0 0] in RGB 
space) side, the parameter cred decreased linearly from 1 to 0 over a run of the minigame. Vice versa, 
for the right, initially blue side ([0 0 1] in RGB space), the parameter cblue increased linearly from 0 to 1 
over a run of the minigame.  The optimal time to press was when cred and cblue had the same value 
(color equivalence point), which happened only once as both parameters changed in opposing 
directions. The time of color equivalence was set to occur at a randomly picked time point drawn from 
a uniform distribution between 2.5 seconds and 4.7 seconds after onset of the color change. The c-
values at that time were set to have a random value ranging from 0.25 to 0.75, also drawn from a 
uniform distribution. This meant the color equivalence point could lie rather towards the pure red or the 
pure blue side (a value of 0.5 indicates an even mix). Note that cred and cblue characterize the average 
color of the two left and two right squares, respectively. Hence, cred (and cblue analogously) was 
subdivided in cred1 and cred2 by multiplying cred with a scaling parameter "colscale", which was 
randomly picked for each run of the minigame and ranged between 0.5 and 1.5 (cred1 = cred x colscale; 
cred2 = cred x (2-colscale)). In other words, cred subdivided so that it was always the average color of cred1 
and cred2. Performance on this task was calculated as:  
  
 
Optimal performance was represented by a performance value of 0 indicating a color match and the 
performance values represented deviation from color equivalence in percent. Negative performance 
values indicate a response that was too quick (the point of equal c values had not yet been reached 
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when the subject responded) and positive performance values indicated a response that was too slow (c 
values are past the point of equality). If absolute performance values exceeded 60, trials were classified 
as false starts. This threshold was based on pilot experiments. Note again, that except for false start 
trials, the performance feedback was unrelated to the performance measure explained here. (B) In the 
time task subjects had to replicate a given time gap between two short occurrences of a blue dot on the 
screen (target time). The target time was randomly picked for each trial from a uniform distribution and 
ranged between 1.5 and 3 seconds. Subjects were instructed to press when the time elapsed after the 
second dot appearance was equal to the target time. The response time was the time from the second 
dot appearance to the button press. Therefore, performance on the task was calculated as:  
 
 
 
As in the color task, optimal performance on the time task was represented by a performance value of 0 
and the performance values represented deviation from the optimal response time in percent. Positive 
performance values indicated a response that was too slow and negative performance values indicated a 
response that was too quick. If absolute performance values exceeded 70, trials were classified as false 
starts. This threshold was based on pilot experiments.  
Red text in (A) and (B) is taken from the subjects' instructions where a similar illustration was used. 
(RT, reaction time).  
PerformanceTimeTask = (response time / target time)×100−100
		
 
Figure S4 (relating to Figure 2) 
Behavioral GLMs on the self ratings (S-ability, left panels) and relevant other ratings (O-ability, 
right panels) for engage trials (panels A and B) and all trials (C). For clarity, filled blue bars 
highlight self-other-mergence interaction (SOMint) effects. We calculated the GLMs shown in Figure 
2B-ii,C-ii (rating GLM2a, Supplemental Experimental Procedures 2) separately over compete and 
cooperate trials. For these GLMs here (rating GLM2b, Supplemental Experimental Procedures 2), 
however, the difference in effects of the observed performance history between cooperate and compete 
trials was coded as an interaction effect (S-performance x Context and O-performance x Context, 
respectively) such that a positive interaction reflects stronger influence of S-performance/O-
performance for cooperate compared to compete trials. (A) We found significant SOMint for S-ability 
(t-test against zero; O-performance x Context effect: t23=3.39; p=0.0025) and O-ability (t-test against 
zero; S-performance x Context: t23=3.21; p=0.0039). The results of these two significance tests are 
shown in the main text in Figure 2B-ii and Figure 2C-ii, respectively. In other words, we used the 
GLMs shown in panel (A) for significance testing of the S-performance and O-performance effects 
binned by social context that are shown in Figure 2B-ii and Figure 2C-ii. Similarly, the beta weights of 
the relevant effects in panel (A) were correlated with brain signals across subjects in Figure 3B-i,ii,iii. 
In detail, this was the behavioral effect of S-performance on S-ability for Figure 3B-i, the effect of O-
performance on S-ability for Figure 3B-ii (also referred to as SOMmain(O-->S), because it is the main 
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effect of the relevant other's performance independent of social context) and the effect of S-
performance x Context on O-ability for Figure 3B-iii. There is also a main effect of Context on O-
ability, suggesting that the other is evaluated better in cooperation than in competition, mirroring 
research demonstrating a general evaluation bias in favour of cooperating in-group members compared 
to competing out-group members (Brewer, 1979). (B) Control GLMs for results presented in panel (A) 
(which used rating GLM2b) that do not use parameters derived from a reinforcement learning (RL; 
Supplemental Experimental Procedures 1) model. These GLMs used the same regressors as in panel 
(A), except that the summary terms for performance history, S-performance and O-performance, were 
replaced with the most recent piece of performance feedback that was received for that player (S-p(t-1) 
and O-p(t-1), respectively). As in panel (A), this control GLM is calculated using engage trials only. 
Interaction effects with social context were calculated as in panel (A) resulting in significantly positive 
SOMint effects for S-ability (O-p(t-1) x Context; t23=3.13; p=0.0047) and O-ability (S-p(t-1) x Context; 
t23=2.92; p=0.0078). This demonstrates that self-other-mergence effects for both S-ability and O-ability 
did not rely on specific parameters used by our RL model for summarizing performance history. (C) 
Control GLMs for results in panel (A) (which used rating GLM2b) showing significant SOMint when 
the analysis is not restricted to engage trials (as in panels (A) and (B)) but also includes trials on which 
subjects avoided cooperation/competition. We repeated rating GLM2b but extended the analysis over 
both engage and avoid choice trials. Including avoid choices is problematic because O performance is 
irrelevant to the participants' outcomes on these trials and so any SOM effects are expected to be 
weaker. To account for choice, we added a binary choice regressor (normalized to a mean of zero and 
standard deviation of 1, positive values for engage, negative values for avoid trials). The SOM on S-
ability (t23=2.67; p=0.0138) and O-ability (t23=2.79; p=0.0103) still remained significant. Note that, 
among the points raised in the main text, this inability to fully distinguish own competence from the 
competence of others might also help understanding why people who cooperate in a group often are not 
able to make good use of the individual knowledge they could contribute (Stasser and Titus, 1985) and, 
in general, why performance in groups is so hard to predict from individual performance (Faber et al., 
2015). (error bars are mean +/-SEM; *, p < 0.05)  
		
 
Figure S5 (relating to Figure 3) 
Supplemental fMRI results. (A) Correlation matrix of regressors of interest at the time of the decision 
over all trials. (B-i) Cluster-corrected negative effects of threshold at the time of the decision. The 
threshold had widespread negative effects, which in medial prefrontal cortex centered on the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and not pgACC or area 9; the threshold-related activity can be 
considered as activity related to the decrement in reward expectation on the current trial caused by the 
presence of the threshold (in other words the cost of the current specific choice) rather than to S-
performance or O-performance. (B-ii,iii) At the time when the rating of the relevant other was made, 
we found cluster-corrected positive effect (main effect of O rating, as opposed to a parametric contrast) 
in several brain regions typically associated with “theory of mind”-type aspects of social cognition 
(Saxe, 2006). These regions include dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, bilateral temporoparietal junction 
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and precuneus (ii). The effect of the social context (compete-cooperate) at the time of the decision had 
widespread cluster-corrected positive effects (iii). The regions include again dorsomedial prefrontal 
cortex and bilateral temporoparietal junction. Although the activation was widespread, the peak of 
activation in dorsomedial prefrontal cortex was, just as in the case of the "theory of mind" activations 
presented in ii, in area 9 as identified by O-performance. (C-i), Single subjects (small black dots) and 
median correlations (red line) between regressors of interest (from panel (A)) and EVchosen (as defined 
in equation 10, Supplemental Experimental Procedures 1). We designed the experiment so that the 
correlations between EVchosen and the expected performance of the players (as well as the corresponding 
interactions by social context) were as small as possible. However expected reward is still linked 
conceptually to S-performance, O-performance x Context and in particular the threshold, as the reward 
outcome of the engage/avoid decision was a linear combination of performance feedback S, 
performance feedback O (positive relation in cooperation, negative relation in competition) and the 
threshold. (C-ii,iii) Effects of regressors of interest for area 9 and pgACC. Grey bars indicate contrasts 
used to identify the ROI. The significance stars on these effects denote the statistical significance from 
analyses conducted at the whole-brain level; these effects were not again tested for significance in the 
ROI (to avoid “double dipping”). Note that the interaction term with social context is coded in a way 
that positive effects mean stronger signals for cooperate compared to compete trials (interaction uses 
"1" for cooperation, "-1" for competition). In Figure 3 of the main manuscript, the interaction term S-
performance x Context is coded the other way around in the fMRI analysis shown, so that positive 
signals indicate stronger responses in compete compared to cooperate trials. This was done for 
visualization purposes only. We used a repeated measures analysis of variance to formally examine 
whether performance related brain signals were indeed different in pgACC compared to area 9 
(Nieuwenhuis et al., 2011). For this, we first used leave-one-out procedures on the whole brain level to 
make sure that we performed this analysis in an unbiased way. With respect to the pgACC ROI, we 
identified the peak voxel for S-performance effects based on the whole group of subjects except one 
left out subject. We repeated this for all subjects. Thus, we were able to conduct ROI analyses without 
selection biases, as each subject's brain signals did not contribute to the ROI that was selected for that 
subject. In the same way, we identified the area 9 ROI using O-performance. We used a 2 [brain 
region] x 4 [performance signal] repeated measures ANOVA to compare the performance-related brain 
signals in both areas. The ANOVA included all four agent-specific signals that we investigated at the 
time of the decision (S-performance, O-performance, S-performance x Context, O-performance x 
Context) and compared their neural effect sizes for area 9 and pgACC. As expected, we found a highly 
significant interaction effect (F3,69=6.7; p=0.0005). Main effects were absent (both p>0.08). (C-iv) 
Analysis of S-performance activity in pgACC in relation to EVchosen. As S-performance is conceptually 
related EVchosen (better S-performance leads to higher payoff in cooperation and competition) compared 
to O-performance (better O-performance leads to higher payoff in cooperation but to lower payoff in 
competition), we went on to analyze more formally if S-performance signals in pgACC could be 
reduced to EVchosen.  
First, we used again a leave-one-out procedure to determine individual pgACC ROIs using S-
performance (see C-ii,iii).Within these ROIs, we conducted a time course analysis (Supplemental 
Experimental Procedures, section 3.3) using EVchosen as the only regressor. We reapplied our original 
GLM (fMRI GLM for decision phase) to the residuals of this time course. In other words, we 
conducted our GLM of interest on a timecourse where the effects of EVchosen had been partialled out. 
The effect of S-performance in this GLM is shown in panel (C-iv) as a time course analysis (left) and 
as a bar chart analysis (t23=2.51; p=0.0196; right, Supplemental Experimental Procedures section 3.3). 
In sum, S-performance effects in pgACC persist after partialling out EVchosen and therefore cannot be 
explained by the expected reward of the choice alone.  
Note that the relationships between brain signals in pgACC and area 9 and behavior shown in 
Figure 3B of the main manuscript were specific to the respective brain area. This meant that any S-
performance signal in area 9, regardless of its significance (in fact such signals were also non-
significant), did not correlate with the effect of S-performance on S-ability (r=-0.27; p=0.20). 
Similarly, the neural signals that correlated with behavior in area 9, when measured in pgACC (again 
regardless of their significance), did not correlate with the behavioral variables shown in Figure 3B-
ii,iii. In detail, any O-performance signal in pgACC did not predict the influence of O-performance on 
S-ability (r=-0.24; p=0.26) and S-performance x Context did not predict SOMint(S-->O) (r=-0.02; 
p=0.91). Note that panels (ii) and (iii) show that none of these three signals was significant in the other 
area over all trials. Moreover, the correlation shown for pgACC was specific for the "rational" 
influence of S-performance on S-ability and did not occur with the "irrational" effect of S-performance 
on O-ability (r=0.03; p=0.88). Analogously, the behavioral correlation associated with area 9’s O-
performance signal was specific to the case of self-other-mergence (correlation of brain signal with O-
		
performance effect on O-ability: r=0.07; p=0.74) and so was the area 9 S-performance x Context effect 
specific to the case of self-other-mergence (correlation of brain signal with S-performance x Context 
effect on S-ability: r=-0.04; p=0.85). 
 (D) Correlation matrix of regressors of interest at the time of feedback (Supplemental Experimental 
Procedures, section 3.3, Figure 4C) over all trials. (E) Supplemental control analysis for self and other 
related signals in pgACC and area 9. We repeated our ROI analysis (similar to panel C-i,ii in this 
figure) for two independent ROIs. A recent meta-analysis of fMRI studies investigated trait judgments 
about self and others (Denny et al., 2012) and identified brain regions in medial frontal cortex where 
self-related judgments show increased BOLD activity compared to other-related judgments (self>other) 
and vice versa (self<other). The two regions correspond to our regions pgACC (i) and area 9 (ii), 
respectively. We replicated our effects of interest shown in Figure 3A for ROIs centered on the peak 
coordinates of these clusters. In detail, we again found a significant effect of S-performance in pgACC 
(t23=3.61, p=0.002), and effects of O-performance (t23=2.56; p=0.018) and S-performance x Context 
(t23=-2.67; p=0.014) in area 9. Therefore, our results are not dependent on using a specific ROI location 
and they link up with the results of previous studies investigating similar concepts. Note that, as in 
panel C, the S-performance x Context effect is sign flipped compared to Figure 3 for ease of 
visualization in the main text. (error bars are mean +/-SEM; *, p < 0.05)  
		
Figure S6 (relating to Figure 4) 
Supplemental analysis of S-pChange and minigame performance. (A) Linear regression on S-
pChange (S-pChange GLM1b, Supplemental Experimental Procedures 2). S-pChange was calculated 
within each minigame. This means that S-pChange reflects the absolute change in performance from a 
trial to the next trial of the same minigame; not across minigames. The filled blue bar indicates the 
SOM related effect. S-pChange from the current to the next trial was higher when subjects received 
performance feedback suggesting that they performed badly (S-feedback effect, t23=-2.344 ; p=0.0281). 
The performance feedback for the relevant other (O) also had an influence on S-pChange, depending 
on the social context in which it was observed. Subjects changed their performance more when the O 
received negative performance feedback in cooperation (just as they did for themselves) and positive 
performance feedback in competition (O-feedback x Context, t23=-2.246 ; p=0.0346). The beta weights 
of this latter regressor were tested in Figure 4B (O-influence on S-pChange) and correlated with 
behavior in Figure 4D. Note that, for visualization purposes, the effect is sign-reversed in Figure 4D. 
(B) Number of false start trials per participant per minigame. (C) Signed minigame performances 
plotted for all subjects for all trials (black crosses), mean signed performance per subject (red dots) and 
mean signed performance for the whole sample (horizontal dark blue line; shaded dark blue indicates 
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standard error of the mean). False start performances are not shown. Note that the figure shows signed 
performance values, because although the absolute value is enough to indicate performance levels, the 
signed performances are necessary to calculate the change in performance from one trial of a minigame 
to the next trial of the same minigame (S-pChange, Supplemental Experimental Procedures 2). For 
both minigames, negative performance values indicate responses that were too quick and positive 
values indicate responses that were too slow. Zero indicates the optimal response time. Performances in 
time and color task were comparable with no differences in mean performance (t23=-0.899; p=0.3778). 
This and the fact that the mapping of performance feedback schedules to minigames was balanced 
across subjects (11 received better performance feedback in the time task and 13 subjects received 
better performance feedback in the color task, see Figure S1A) makes it unlikely that S-pChange 
effects were driven by performance differences in the minigames. (error bars are mean +/-SEM; *, p < 
0.05) 
  
		
 
Table S1 (relating to Figure 2) 
Supplemental reinforcement learning model results. Summary of parameter estimates (SEM is 
standard error of the mean).  
RL model fitted on ratings and engage/avoid decisions 
Parameter α β 
Median (SEM) 0.3906 (0.0359) 0.4684 (0.0489) 
		
Supplemental Experimental Procedures. 
1. Reinforcement learning model 
For every subject, we fitted a standard reinforcement learning model to model the performance 
estimates assigned to the three players trial by trial (Self, S; Other1, O1; Other2, O2). We used two 
minigame specific (Color Task, T1; Time Task, T2) performance estimates per player. The 
performance estimates summarize the previous performance history and are hence referred to as 
performance. They reflect the expected performance based on a recency-weighted average of past 
performance feedback. This resulted in six player and minigame specific performance estimates: 
performanceS-T1, performanceS-T2, performanceO1-T1, performanceO1-T2, performanceO2-T1, 
performanceO2-T2. On every trial t, the three performance estimates associated with the current 
minigame were updated using a prediction error (PE) based learning rule with a learning rate α as a 
free parameter: 
1) 	
 (formula was applied separately for S, O1, O2, given T1 or T2)  
 
The PE itself was calculated based on the specific performance estimate and performance feedback of 
the player in the current minigame as:  
 
2)   
(formula was applied separately for S, O1, O2, given T1 or T2) 
 
In false start trials, the performance estimate for S was not updated and remained unchanged until the 
next trial of the same minigame. No PEs for S were calculated for false start trials (the other players 
never displayed false start trials). For the first trial of the session for each player for each minigame, no 
performance estimates and prediction errors were calculated, but the initial performance feedbacks 
were used as the starting performance estimates for the respective player in the respective minigame.  
 
In each trial after the four starter trials, subjects made a decision about cooperating or competing 
(depending on the current context) with the relevant other (O) and in addition provided ratings of both 
S and O. Both engage/avoid decisions and ratings were modeled based on performance estimates for S 
and the O, called S-performance and O-performance. S-performance is the performance estimate for 
Self associated with the minigame of the current trial (performanceS-T1 or performanceS-T2). Similarly, 
O-performance refers to performanceO-T1, performanceO1-T2, performanceO2-T1 and performanceO2-T2, 
depending on which other player was currently selected as the O and which minigame took place. 
Therefore, S-performance and O-performance represented minigame and player specific performance 
expectations of the players involved in the current trial's engage/avoid decision. The same was the case 
for the PEs associated with S and O. 
 
Subjects’ ratings of a player reflected expectations of whether they would perform either better or 
worse than a level indicated by a rating marker the position of which was adjusted from trial to trial 
using a staircase procedure explained in Experimental Procedures ("Ability ratings"). Expectations 
expressed in the ratings that exceeded or fell below the rating marker were referred to as positive and 
negative ratings, respectively. To calculate the probability of a positive rating (p(positiveRating)), we 
used a softmax function with an inverse temperature β. This was done separately for S and O using S-
performance and O-performance, respectively as well as the player specific rating marker: 
 
3)  
(this formula was applied separately for S-performance and O-performance given their respective 
rating markers) 
 
Having calculated the probability of a positive rating on a given trial, the probability of the rating 
actually observed was derived, again, separately for S and O: 
 
Performancet+1 = performancet +α ×PEt
PEt = feedbackt − performancet
P(positiveRating) = exp[β × (performance− ratingmarker)]exp[β × (performance− ratingmarker)]+1
		
4)  
(formula was applied separately for S and O) 
 
Subjects also received a small gain or loss at the end of a trial if they had made a positive rating and the 
expectation indicated by that rating had been accurate (ratingbonus of 0.25 points).  As explained in the 
Experimental Procedures, to ensure that there was no temptation to perform poorly in the task no 
ratingbonus was awarded when a negative rating had been given. The expected value of a rating 
(EVrating) was calculated as 
 
5)  
(formula was applied separately for S and O) 
 
Note the bounds of EVrating for positive ratings are 0.25 and -0.25, which are the points that can be lost 
or won for positive ratings. 
 
In addition to completing a rating for S and O on each trial, subjects made a decision to engage in or 
avoid cooperating/competing. Given the objective social context specific payoff scheme of the task 
(equations 1a and 1b in Experimental Procedures section), the subjective expected value of engaging in 
cooperation/competition (EVengage) was calculated in an analogous way: 
 
6a)  
 
6b)  
 
A decision to avoid cooperating/competing led to a gain of 1.5 points and a loss of 1.5 points with 
equal probability (see " Experimental design and schedule" in Experimental Procedures) and subjects 
had been instructed that the expected value of the decisions to avoid cooperating/competing was zero: 
 
7)  
 
Therefore, EVengage was used as decision variable for the engage/avoid decisions to calculate the 
probability of engaging in cooperation or competition: 
8)  
 
Note that EVavoid is zero in equation 8, as explained above. The probabilities of the actual choices made 
were derived from p(engage): 
9)  
 
The full reward expectation on each trial (EVchosen) was defined as the sum of the expected values from 
both ratings and the expected value of the engage/avoid decision (equations 5 and 7): 
 
10)  
 
The reward prediction error (RPE) was calculated based on all reward outcomes of a trial including 
both rating reward outcomes and the engage/avoid decision reward outcome (see above equation 2 for 
the calculation of player specific prediction errors): 
P(rating) = { p(positiveRating) if rated positively1− p(positiveRating) if rated negatively
EVrating =
[p(positiveRating)− 0.5]×2× ratingbonus if rated positively
0 if rated negatively
#
$
%
Competition : EVengage = S-performance−O-performance− threshold
Cooperation : EVengage = (S-performance+O-performance) / 2− threshold
EVEAD =
EVengage if engage
0 if avoid
!
"
#
P(engage) = exp(β ×EVengage )exp(β ×EVengage )+ exp(β ×EVavoid )
P(choice) = { P (engage) if engage1−P(engage) if avoid
EVchosen = EVS−Rating +EVO−Rating +EVEAD
		
 
11)  
 
Overall, the free parameter set θ comprised two free parameters: the learning rate α and the inverse 
temperature β. We fitted these parameters for every subject separately by minimizing the negative log 
likelihood (nLL) over all trials N, given a set of parameter values. For the calculation of nLL, we 
treated ratings and engage/avoid decisions equally. So the decisions used to fit the model included 
equal proportions of ratings of S, ratings of the O and engage/avoid choices to improve the model fit. 
 
12)   
RPE = Reward−EVchosen
nLL = − log(p(decisiont
n=1
N
∑ θ ))
		
2. Behavioral analyses 
 
We used general linear models (GLM) to examine the impact of different factors on behavior. GLMs 
were applied to the ability ratings for (S and O ("Rating GLM for S/O"), to the engage/avoid choices 
("Choice GLM") and to an index of true performance change over trials ("pChange GLM"). For all 
GLMs, all regressors were normalized (mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1).  
 
Our first analyses aimed to show that subjects relied on performance feedback for their ratings and 
engage/avoid choices. For this, we predicted S and O ratings on the basis of S’s and O’s recent 
performance feedback history (last four trials; referred to as "feedback" below) at trial t. In addition, 
the GLMs contained the value indicated by the rating marker (the rating marker indicated a 
performance level with reference to which the rating should be made; see "Ability ratings" in 
Experimental Procedures): 
 
Rating GLM 1 for S:  
feedback-St-1, feedback-St-2, feedback-St-3, feedback-St-4, ratingmarker-S (Figure 2B-i) 
 
Rating GLM 1 for O:  
feedback-Ot-1, feedback-Ot-2, feedback-Ot-3, feedback-Ot-4, ratingmarker-O  (Figure 2C-i) 
 
As an aggregate index of performance feedback, we fitted a reinforcement learning (RL) model on the 
rating data (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures 1 for details on the RL model) and used S-
performance (recency-weighted performance estimate for self) and O-performance (recency-weighted 
performance estimate for relevant other) to explain engage/avoid decisions. For this analysis, the RL 
model was fitted on the ratings only and not on the engage/avoid decisions (all other analyses including 
neural analyses were fitted on both ratings and choices to improve model fit). We applied the same 
GLM separately to cooperative and competitive trials: 
 
Choice GLM1 - binned by social context (cooperate/compete):  
S-performance, O-performance, threshold (Figure 2D) 
 
The second set of analyses aimed to investigate more subtle effects of self-other-mergence (SOM) in 
the rating data. Again, we used S-performance and O-performance from the RL model. Note that the 
SOM GLM effects are orthogonal to the fitting done in the RL model and all SOM related effects we 
present in this manuscript can be shown without the use of a reinforcement learning model i.e. by using 
past performance feedback directly to explain choices (Figure 4B and S6A, Figure S4B). The following 
analysis was restricted to engage trials only (a supplementary analysis with the same results using all 
trials including those on which subjects refrained from cooperation and competition can be found in 
Figure S4C). We focused first on engage trials because the social context is critical on these trials 
(rather than on “avoid” trials when subjects simply took the default option of a random payment). The 
GLM was applied separately to cooperate and compete trials: 
 
Rating GLM2a for S - binned by social context (cooperate/compete): 
S-performance, O-performance, ratingmarker-S (Figure 2B-ii) 
 
Rating GLM2a for O - binned by social context (cooperate/compete): 
O-performance, S-performance, ratingmarker-O (Figure 2C-ii) 
 
Note we used S-performance in the S rating and O-performance in the O rating as control parameters 
and the resulting beta weights for those regressors were only used as indices of individual variability, 
for instance to establish correlations with brain signals; we did not test such effects for significance as 
they had been fitted on the same ratings. The main aim of this GLM was to assess whether ratings 
indicated, in addition to agent-consistent effects, an inappropriate influence of the performance history 
of the different player (underlined above; for example an influence of O-performance on the S rating, 
or an influence of S-performance on the O rating). The binned rating GLM2a was used for 
visualization. However, as we were interested in the differences of agent misattributed effects in 
cooperate and compete conditions (i.e. the interaction by social context), we devised an analogous 
rating GLM2b that was not binned by social context, but instead contained interaction terms of 
regressors of interest with social context. These interaction effects were tested for significance of 
SOMint ("int" denotes "interaction"). To calculate the interaction terms, S-performance x Context for 
		
example, S-performance was normalized and multiplied with 1 for cooperate trials and -1 for compete 
trials (the number of cooperate and compete trials was identical over the whole session); the same was 
done for O-performance. Hence, a positive interaction effect indicated that the effect of S-performance 
was stronger in cooperation than in competition. For analyses restricted to engage trials the 1/-1 term 
indicating cooperation or competition was normalized as well to account for possible differences in 
trial number. GLM2b, like GLM2a, was restricted to engage trials. 
 
Rating GLM2b for S - with interaction by social context:  
S-performance, O-performance, S-performance x Context, O-performance x Context, Context, 
ratingmarker-S  
(SOMint(O-->S) is underlined; Figure S4A) 
 
Rating GLM2b for O - with interaction by social context:   
S-performance, O-performance, S-performance x Context, O-performance x Context, Context, 
ratingmarker-O  
(SOMint(S-->O) is underlined; Figure S4A) 
 
Additional versions of rating GLM2b that did not use an RL model (Figure S4B) or are based on all 
trials (instead of engage trials only; Figure S4C) are presented in Figure S4. 
 
We also analyzed performance in the minigames (see Figure S3 for details on the minigames and their 
performance definitions). For these analyses, we used a measure of subjects' true performance change 
(S-pChange) from any trial, t, to the following trial of the same minigame, t+1. S-pChange for a given 
trial t was calculated as the logarithm of the absolute performance difference: 
 
 
 
The performance measure was signed with zero indicating optimal performance while positive and 
negative values indicated responses that were too slow or too quick, respectively (Figure S6). The use 
of predetermined performance feedback schedules meant that performance feedback could not be 
improved by more optimal performance in the minigames (except false start trials as a case of veridical 
performance feedback, see Figure S2C and Figure S6B showing the number of false start trials per 
subject). This made it possible to use S-pChange as a measure of behavioral adjustments based on 
performance feedback. Performances from false start trials were treated as outliers and therefore no S-
pChange for a false start trial and the trial directly preceding it were calculated. Note that the 
performance measures for both minigames were comparable and the performance feedback schedules 
were balanced over both minigames (Figure S6). The main aim of this set of analyses was to 
investigate whether behavioral adjustments were also influenced by performance feedback for the O 
depending on the social context (cooperation or competition). For this, similar to rating GLM2, we 
used two analogous versions of a GLM; one applied to cooperate and compete trials separately for 
visualization, and one version applied to all trials to test interaction by social context effects for 
significance. We investigated the relationship of S-pChange (for trial t indicating the transition from 
trial t to t t+1, see definition of S-pChange above) to the three variables that determine reward 
outcomes in engage/avoid decisions: S performance feedback, O performance feedback and threshold 
(all for trial t) 
 
S-pChange GLM1a - binned by social context on trial t (cooperate/compete):  
S-feedback, O-feedback, threshold (Figure 4B) 
 
As in previous analyses, significance of effects was calculated over all trials, using the interaction 
effect of performance feedback and social context on trial t. 
 
pChange GLM1b - all trials: 
S-feedback, O-feedback, S-feedback x Context, O-feedback x Context, Context, threshold  
(SOM-related effect is underlined; Figure S6A) 
 
Note that when using the threshold regressor over all trials, we combined the threshold regressors from 
cooperate and compete conditions and normalized them separately for each condition, as in the 
following neural analyses. The resulting regressor was also again normalized to have a mean of zero 
S-pChanget = log(1+ performancet+1 − performancet )
		
and standard deviation of 1. S-pChange was normalized separately for individual subjects in these 
GLMs. Positive interactions by context again indicated stronger influence of the performance feedback 
on cooperate compared to compete trials. 
  
		
3. MRI data acquisition and analysis 
 
3.1 MRI data acquisition and preprocessing. Imaging data were collected on a 3 Tesla Siemens MRI 
scanner using a 32 channel head coil. T1-weighted structural images were acquired with the settings 
TR=3sec, TE=4.75mssec, TI = 1100msec, 1x1x1mm voxel size, 256x176x224 grid. Functional images 
were acquired using a Deichmann echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence with TR=3s, TE=30 ms, 
3x3x3mm voxel size, 87° flip angle, 30° slice angle and z-shimming to reduce signal distortions as 
well as dropout in medial orbitofrontal areas (Deichmann et al., 2003). 
 
We used FMRIB's Software Library (FSL) to analyze imaging data (Smith et al., 2004). FMRI data 
preprocessing comprised spatial (Gaussian using full-width half maximum of 5 mm) and temporal 
filtering (3 dB cut-off at 100sec), motion correction with FSL’s MCFLIRT and filtering of noise 
components after visual inspection using FSL's MELODIC. In a two-step procedure via subjects' 
individual structural MRI images, preprocessed functional data were nonlinearly registered to Montreal 
Neurological Institute (MNI) space. 
 
3.2 MRI whole-brain analyses. We used FSL FEAT (Smith et al., 2004) for first level analyses. fMRI 
data were pre-whitened with FSL FILM to account for temporal autocorrelations. Motion regressors 
from MCFLIRT were included as nuisance regressors of no interest. Temporal derivatives of relevant 
regressors were included and the model was temporally filtered before it was applied to the data. Group 
results on the second level were calculated using FSL FLAME 1 with outlier de-weighting and a 
cluster-forming threshold of z>2.5 and p<0.05. 
 
We used a single fMRI GLM for whole brain analysis. The same design was used for subsequent 
region of interest (ROI) analyses. The GLM includes RL-based regressors, which were fitted 
individually on all ratings and engage/avoid decisions (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures 1 
for details on the RL model). All parametric regressors were normalized (mean of zero, standard 
deviation of one). The two main phases of interest were the decision phase and the feedback phase.  
 
The decision phase was defined as the time period from engage/avoid decision onset to the 
engage/avoid choice subjects made (phase 1,2 and 3 in Figure S2A-ii). We modeled the decision phase 
as a constant regressor and accompanying parametric regressors. The parametric regressors of interest 
comprised: 
• S-performance 
• O-performance 
• S-performance x Context,  
• O-performance x Context,  
• Context (binary regressor; cooperation 1, competition -1) 
• Threshold 
• logRT 
The two interaction terms and threshold were calculated as explained in the Supplemental 
Experimental Procedures section 2 "Behavioral analyses". logRT is the logarithm of the engage/avoid 
decision reaction time (see phase 3 in Figure S2A-i). The timing parameters for the parametric 
regressors were identical with the constant decision phase regressor, except for threshold and logRT. 
These regressors' onsets were delayed by one second, as the threshold was only revealed one second 
after engage/avoid decision onset and knowledge of the threshold was necessary to make an 
engage/avoid decision (see phase 2 in Figure S2A-i). 
  
Decision phases from starter trials were excluded from the decision regressor and accounted for by a 
regressor of no interest. Correlations between parametric regressors are shown in Figure S5A 
(however, note that this correlation matrix also contains an additional regressor that was used in the 
ROI version of this design, EVS-Rating+O-Rating, but not logRT, as the latter was not a regressor of 
interest). 
 
We used two constant regressors with a duration of zero time-locked to the response of S and O rating 
to account for the rating events (Figure S5B-ii shows this effect for O). In addition we used parametric 
regressors accompanying these constant regressors accounting for the reward expectations associated 
with the ratings (EVrating for S and O from equation 5 in Supplemental Experimental Procedures 1 for S 
rating and O rating, respectively).  
 
		
The feedback phase was similarly modeled as a constant regressor and parametric modulators. Note 
that trial feedback was chunked in three components and presented in randomized order ("Feedback" in 
Experimental Procedures and Figure S2A-ii): 
I) S and O performance feedback and rating reward outcomes 
II) Engage/avoid decision reward outcome 
III) Irrelevant other performance feedback 
Duration of the constant feedback regressor was 2.5 seconds, the time window in which the three 
feedback components initially appeared (phase 2 onset to phase 4 onset in Figure S2A-ii). Parametric 
regressors were modeled as stick functions (i.e. duration of zero) time-locked to the appearance of the 
relevant feedback component. They comprised: 
• S-performance (I) 
• O-performance (I) 
• S-PE (Prediction error for Self) (I) 
• O-PE (Prediction error for relevant other) (I) 
• O-PE x Context (I) 
• Prediction error - irrelevant other (III) 
• Context (I) 
• S-pChange (I)  
• EVchosen (see equation 10; II) 
• Reward prediction error (RPE; see equation 11; II) 
Roman numerals in brackets after the regressors indicate to which feedback component a regressor was 
time-locked. Feedback phases from starter trials, from false start trials and from trials on which no S-
pChange could be calculated (see "Behavioral analyses" in Supplemental Experimental Procedures 2) 
were excluded from the feedback regressor and modeled as events of no interest. Correlations between 
parametric regressors are shown in Figure S5. 
 
In addition, the GLM contained three regressors of no interest. First, a regressor time-locked to all 
button presses, modeled as stick functions, to account for movement-related effects. Second, two 
regressors captured brain signals associated with each minigame, spanning the time period from 
minigame onset to response button press. 
 
3.3 ROI analyses. ROIs had a radius of three voxels and were centered on peak voxels of significant 
clusters from the whole brain GLM (Table 1). For ROI analyses, we transformed MNI to subject space 
and extracted the pre-processed BOLD time courses, averaged per volume. The time courses were 
normalized, oversampled by a factor of 20 and time-locked to decision phase onset and feedback phase 
onset (same onset timings as the constant regressors in the whole-brain GLM). We applied a GLM to 
each time point and computed one beta weight per regressor and time point, resulting in a time course 
of beta weights for each regressor. We extracted individual variation in signal size at the time of the 
group peak signal in an analysis window of 4 to 13 seconds from decision and feedback phase onset to 
relate brain activity to behavior. All regressors were normalized (mean of zero, standard deviation of 
one) for all ROI GLMs. 
 
The ROI GLM for the decision phase contained the parametric regressors as the whole brain GLM, 
and, in addition contained a parametric regressor that was the sum of the EVrating (equation 5 in 
Supplemental Experimental Procedures 1, RL section) for S and O to account for the reward 
expectation associated with those events: 
• S-performance 
• O-performance 
• S-performance x Context,  
• O-performance x Context,  
• Context (binary regressor; cooperation 1, competition -1) 
• Threshold 
• logRT 
• EVrating-S+rating-O 
Note that the ROI GLM for the decision phase was restricted to trials in which subjects made and 
engage choice rather than to avoid cooperating/competing. We did this to relate peak signal sizes from 
effects of interest in this analysis to behavioral beta weights from rating GLM2b (Figure S4A), which 
was also calculated over engage trials only. 
 
		
The feedback related ROI GLM contained the same feedback related parametric regressors as listed for 
the whole brain GLM: 
• S-performance  
• O-performance  
• S-PE (Prediction error for Self)  
• O-PE (Prediction error for relevant other)  
• O-PE x Context  
• Prediction error - irrelevant other  
• Context  
• S-pChange  
• EVchosen (see equation 10) 
• Reward prediction error (RPE; see equation 11) 
 
The GLM for the feedback phase was calculated over all trials. We investigated signal sizes at the time 
of the group peak of relevant regressors in relation to behavioral beta weights from S-pChange GLM1b 
(O-feedback x Context), which was also calculated based on all trials. 
 
We used a leave-one-out procedure on the group peak signal of the beta time course to do significance 
testing and avoid temporal selection biases. For every subject, we took the average beta time course of 
the relevant regressor based on the remaining 23 subjects. We identified the (positive or negative) 
group peak in the analysis window of 4 to 13 seconds from phase onset and then took the beta weight 
of the remaining subject at the time of that peak. We repeated this for all subjects. Therefore, the 
resulting 24 "peak" beta weights were selected independently of the time course of the subject 
analyzed. We assessed significance using t-tests on these resulting beta weights. For correlations with 
behavioral beta weights, the individual neural beta weights at the time of the group peak were used. 
 
To illustrate some of the correlations between neural beta weights and behavioral beta weights (Figure 
3B-ii,iii, Figure 4D), we used a median split procedure, in which our group of subjects was subdivided 
in two groups of 12 subjects based on their neural beta weight being low (i.e. below the median) or 
high (i.e. above the median) at the time of the group peak. Mean and standard error of the behavioral 
beta weight of interest are shown in the bar plots of these figures (right hand side of Figure 3B-ii,iii, 
and right hand side of Figure 4D).  
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